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Abstract
The time evolution of aggregate economic variables, such as stock prices, is aﬀected
by market expectations of individual investors. Neo-classical economic theory assumes
that individuals form expectations rationally, thus enforcing prices to track economic
fundamentals and leading to an eﬃcient allocation of resources. However, laboratory ex-
periments with human subjects have shown that individuals do not behave fully rational
but instead follow simple heuristics. In laboratory markets prices may show persistent
deviations from fundamentals similar to the large swings observed in real stock prices.
Here we show that evolutionary selection among simple forecasting heuristics can
explain coordination of individual behavior leading to three diﬀerent aggregate outcomes
observed in recent laboratory market forecasting experiments: slow monotonic price
convergence, oscillatory dampened price ﬂuctuations and persistent price oscillations. In
our model forecasting strategies are selected every period from a small population of
plausible heuristics, such as adaptive expectations and trend following rules. Individuals
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1adapt their strategies over time, based on the relative forecasting performance of the
heuristics. As a result, the evolutionary switching mechanism exhibits path dependence
and matches individual forecasting behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes in
the experiments. Our results are in line with recent work on agent-based models of
interaction and contribute to a behavioral explanation of universal features of ﬁnancial
markets.
JEL codes: E37, G12, D84, C91, C92.
Keywords: Expectations feedback; Experiments; Heuristics; Evolutionary learning; Asset-
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21 Introduction
The time evolution of aggregate economic variables, such as stock prices, is aﬀected by market
expectations of individual investors. Neo-classical economic theory assumes that individuals
form expectations rationally, thus enforcing prices to track economic fundamentals and leading
to an eﬃcient allocation of resources. This tradition, which goes back to seminal work by Muth
(Muth, 1961), has a strong theoretical appealing. Much of the economic progress of the last
40 years can be attributed to the success of the Rational Expectations. Unfortunately, this
approach also shifts the economists’ attention from many interesting short- or medium-run
phenomena, such as imperfect learning or herding behavior, which lie outside the domain of
full rationality.
Even before the rational expectations became a leading paradigm in economics, Herbert
Simon (Simon, 1957) argued that rationality imposes unrealistically strong informational and
computational requirements upon individual behavior. Furthermore, the rational expectations
approach leaves open the question of how people acquire these expectations, and in case if
they do it through experience, what are the property of economy during such learning process.
Laboratory experiments with human subjects, which allow researchers analyze this process
directly, have shown that individuals do not behave fully rational but instead follow simple
heuristics (see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and the Nobel prize lecture by Kahneman
(2003)). These heuristics can account for persistent biases in the decision making. Such
approach explains why in laboratory prices may show persistent deviations from fundamentals
similar to the large swings observed in real stock prices.
On the theoretical side, a number of models of bounded rationality have also been developed
in diﬀerent ﬁelds, see Conlisk (1996) for a comprehensive review. In macroeconomics Sargent
(1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) advocate the use of diﬀerent forms of adaptive
learning, under which agents do not know a precise economic system but apply econometric
techniques for learning it. In game theory Arthur (1991) and Erev and Roth (1998) explain
a number of experiments by simple reinforcement learning models, in which agents choose
strategies on the basis of their past success.
3All these approaches can be expressed in terms of behavior of a single, representative agent,
and leave, therefore, no space for heterogeneity of participants, which is also often found in
experiments. But heterogeneity might be crucial for explaining a number of striking ﬁndings
of a recent learning to forecast experiments, described at length in Hommes, Sonnemans,
Tuinstra, and Velden (2005). There, in a stationary environment participants, during a number
of periods, had to predict the price of a risky asset (say a stock) having knowledge of the
fundamental parameters (mean dividend and interest rate) and previous price realizations,
but without knowing the forecasts of others. If all agents would behave rationally or learn to
behave rationally, the market price would quickly converge to a constant fundamental value
pf = 60. While in some groups convergence did happen, in other groups prices persistently
ﬂuctuated (see Fig. 1 Left). What was even more striking, is that in all groups individuals
were able to coordinate their forecasts (see Fig. 2 Left).
In this paper we present ﬁrst evidence that evolutionary selection among simple forecast-
ing heterogeneous heuristics can explain coordination of individual behavior leading to three
diﬀerent aggregate outcomes: slow monotonic price convergence, oscillatory dampened price
ﬂuctuations and persistent price oscillations. In our model forecasting strategies are selected
every period from a small population of plausible heuristics, such as adaptive expectations
and trend following rules. Individuals adapt their strategies over time, based on the relative
forecasting performance of the heuristics. As a result, the evolutionary switching mechanism
exhibits path dependence and matches individual forecasting behavior as well as aggregate
market outcomes in the experiments. The only diﬀerences between the model simulations in
Figs. 1 and 2 are the initial prices and the initial distribution over the heuristics.
2 Laboratory experiment
A number of sessions of a computerized learning to forecast experiment have been performed in
the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam; see Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra,
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Figure 1: Laboratory experiments and heuristics switching model simulations.
Prices (Left) for laboratory experiments (red) and evolutionary model (green). Fractions
(Right) of four forecasting heuristics: adaptive expectations (ADA, purple), weak trend fol-
lowers (WTR, green), strong trend followers (STR, blue) and anchoring adjustment heuristic
(A&A, red). Coordination of individual forecasts explains three diﬀerent aggregate market
outcomes: monotonic convergence to equilibrium (Top), oscillatory convergence (Middle) and
permanent oscillations (Bottom). Oscillations may be triggered by initial prices, are reinforced
when the initial fraction of weak and strong trend heuristics is relatively large and may be
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Figure 2: Coordination in laboratory experiments and model simulations. Individual
predictions of 6 participants in the laboratory experiments (Left) and predictions of 4 fore-
casting heuristics in evolutionary heuristics switching model (Right). Heuristics are: adaptive
expectations (ADA, purple), weak trend followers (WTR, green), strong trend followers (STR,
blue) and anchoring adjustment heuristic (A&A, red). Coordination of individual forecasts
arises both in the experiment and in the simulation model in all observed aggregate outcomes:
monotonic convergence to equilibrium (Top), oscillatory convergence (Middle) and permanent
oscillations (Bottom).
6had to predict the price of an asset for 51 periods and have been rewarded according to the
accuracy of their predictions. The participants were told that they are advisers to a pension
fund and that this pension fund can invest money either in a risk free asset with real interest
rate r per period or in shares of an inﬁnitely lived risky asset. In each period the risky asset
pays uncertain dividend which is a random variable, independent identically distributed (IID),
with mean ¯ y. The price of the risky asset, pt, is determined by a market clearing equation
on the basis of the investment strategies of the pension fund. The exact functional form of
the strategies and the equilibrium equation were unknown to the participants, but they were
informed that the higher their forecast is, the larger will be the demand for the risky asset of
the pension fund. Participants also knew the values of the parameters r = 0.05 and ¯ y = 3,
and therefore had enough information to compute the rational fundamental price (i.e. the
discounted sum of the expected future dividend stream) of the risky asset pf = ¯ y/r = 60.
Every session of the experiment lasted 51 periods. In every period each of the 6 participants
provided a two period ahead forecast for the price of the risky asset, given the available
information. This information consisted of past prices (up to two lags) of the risky asset and
own past predictions (up to one lag) made by the participant. Participants did not know
the predictions of other participants, neither did they know exactly how their own forecast
aﬀected the equilibrium price. When all 6 predictions for the price in period t + 1 have been
submitted, the current market clearing price was computed according to a standard model of
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t+1 denotes an (equally weighted) average of the 6 individual forecasts, r(= 0.05) is the
risk free interest rate, ¯ y(= 3) is the mean dividend, εt is a stochastic term representing small
demand and supply shocks, and nt stands for a small fraction of “robot” traders who always
submit a fundamental forecast pf. These robot traders were introduced as a “stabilizing force”
in the experiment to prevent the occurrence of large bubbles. The fraction of robot traders
7increased as the price moved away from its fundamental equilibrium level:











This mechanism reﬂects the feature that in real markets there is more agreement about over-
or undervaluation when the deviation from the fundamental is large. At the end of each period













There were 7 sessions of the experiment. The stochastic shocks εt were the same in all sessions
(normally distributed, with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5).
Findings of the experiment
The main ﬁndings of the experiment are as follows. First, realized asset prices diﬀered sig-
niﬁcantly from the rational fundamental price in all sessions. Comparison of the experiment
with prediction of the rational expectations model shows that on average the asset was un-
dervalued. Furthermore, prices exhibited excess volatility, with much larger swings than the
rational expectations model.
Second, three diﬀerent price patterns were observed, see Fig. 1 Left. In group 2 (Top)
and group 5 (not shown) the price of the asset slowly converged, almost monotonically, to
the fundamental price. In group 4 (not shown) and group 7 (Middle) large initial ﬂuctuations
were observed, dampening slowly towards the end of the experiment. In group 1 (Bottom)
and group 6 (not shown) the price oscillates around the fundamental price with an (almost)
constant amplitude. (Price dynamics in group 3 (not shown) was more diﬃcult to classify,
somewhere between oscillations and convergence).
Third, analysis of the individual price predictions reveals that during each session the
participants were able to coordinate on a common prediction strategy, as illustrated in Fig. 2
Left. Finally, estimation of the individual predictions (based on the last 40 observations, to
allow for a short learning phase) showed that participants had a tendency to use simple, linear
8forecasting rules, such as naive expectations (i.e. the forecast is simply the last observed price)
and adaptive expectations (a weighted average of the last observed price and the last forecast).
Many participants only used the two most recently observed prices, for example in a simple
linear trend extrapolation forecasting rule.
3 Evolutionary Model
In our simulation model agents will select rules from a population of simple forecasting rules or
heuristics. The choice of heuristics will be governed by an evolutionary selection mechanism,
based on the principle that more successful strategies will attract more followers. Strategy
performance is measured by accumulated (negative) squared prediction errors, in line with the
payment incentives in the laboratory experiments.
3.1 Forecasting Heuristics
To keep our model as simple as possible, but rich enough to explain the diﬀerent observed
price patterns, we have chosen only 4 heuristics which are intuitively simple and were among
the rules estimated on the individual forecasts in the experiment. A behavioral interpretation
underlies each heuristic. The ﬁrst heuristic is an adaptive expectations (ADA) rule, using
a weighted average between the last observed market price and the last individual forecast.
Note that at the moment when forecasts of price pt+1 are submitted, price pt is still unknown
(see Eq. 1) and the last observed price is pt−1. At the same time, the last own forecast pe
t,1 is
known when forecasting pt+1. We have chosen the following ADA rule:
p
e
t+1,1 = 0.65pt−1 + 0.35p
e
t,1 . (4)
The second and third heuristics are trend following rules extrapolating a weak or a strong
trend respectively. They simply predict the last observed price level plus a multiple of the
last observed price change, and only diﬀer in the magnitude of the extrapolation factor. In
the case of weak trend rule (WTR) the factor is small and equal to 0.4, so that the rule is
p
e
t+1,2 = pt−1 + 0.4(pt−1 − pt−2). (5)
9The strong trend rule (STR) has a larger extrapolation factor 1.3 and is given by
p
e
t+1,3 = pt−1 + 1.3(pt−1 − pt−2). (6)
The fourth heuristic is slightly more complicated. It combines an average prediction of the last
observed price and an estimate of the long run equilibrium price level with an extrapolation





t−1 + pt−1) + (pt−1 − pt−2), (7)
where pav
t−1 is the sample average of all past prices, that is, pav
t−1 =
Pt−1
j=0 pj. This rule is an
anchoring and adjustment heuristic (A&A), since it uses a (time varying) anchor or reference
point, 0.5(pav
t−1+pt−1), deﬁned as an (equally weighted) average between the last observed price
and the sample mean of all past prices, and extrapolates the last price change (pt−1−pt−2) from
there. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have shown that people often rely on such anchoring
and adjustment heuristics. The A&A rule has been obtained from a related linear forecasting
rule pe = 30 + 1.5pt−1 − pt−2 = 0.5(pf + pt−1) + (pt−1 − pt−2), used by some individuals in
the experiment. In the experiment however, subjects did not know the fundamental price pf
explicitly, but were able to learn an anchor 0.5(pf + pt−1) and extrapolate price changes from
there. Therefore, we replaced pf in the rule by a proxy, given by the observed sample average
of prices.
The ﬁrst three rules (Eqs. 4–6) are ﬁrst order heuristics in the sense that they only use the
last observed price level, the last forecast and/or the last observed price change. The fourth
heuristic (Eq. 7) combines adaptive learning of the price level and trend extrapolation.
3.2 Evolutionary Switching
Which forecasting heuristics from the population should agents choose? Our simulation model
is based upon evolutionary switching between the four forecasting heuristics, driven by the
past relative performance of the heuristics. Heuristics that have been more successful in the
past, will attract more followers. The performance measure is (minus) squared forecasting
10errors, similar to the ﬁnancial rewards in the experiment. The performance of heuristic h,






¢2 + η Ut−1,h . (8)
The parameter 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 measures relative weight agents give to past errors and thus
represents their memory strength. When η = 0, only the performance of the last period plays
a role in the updating of the shares assigned to the diﬀerent rules. For 0 < η ≤ 1, all past
prediction errors aﬀect the heuristic’s performance.
Given the performance measure, the weight assigned to rule h is updated according to a
discrete choice model with asynchronous updating (Hommes, Huang, and Wang, 2005; Diks
and Weide, 2005)






h=1 exp(β Ut−1,h) is a normalization factor. There are two important parame-
ters in Eq. 9. The parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 gives some persistence or inertia in the weight assigned
to rule h, reﬂecting the fact that not all the participants are willing to update their rule in
every period. Hence, δ may be interpreted as the fraction of individuals who stick to their
previous strategy. In the extreme case δ = 1, the initial weights assigned to the rules never
change, no matter what their past performance is. If 0 ≤ δ < 1, in each period a fraction 1−δ
of participants updates their rule according to the well known discrete choice model used for
example in Brock and Hommes (15). The parameter β ≥ 0 represents the intensity of choice
measuring how sensitive individuals are to diﬀerences in strategy performance. The higher
the intensity of choice β, the faster individuals will switch to more successful rules. In the
extreme case β = 0, the fractions in Eq. 9 move to an equal distribution independent of their
past performance. At the other extreme β = ∞, all agents who update their heuristic (i.e. a
fraction 1 − δ) switch to the most successful predictor.























t+1,4 are the predictions for period t + 1 according to the 4 heuristics in
Eqs. 4–7, nt,1,...,nt,4 are the fractions using these heuristics described by Eqs. 8–9, nt stands
for a small fraction of “robot” traders described by Eq. 2, r(= 0.05) is the risk free interest rate,
¯ y(= 3) is the mean dividend, pf(= 60) is the fundamental price and εt is the stochastic term
representing small demand and supply shocks (taken to be the same as in the experiment).
3.3 Model Initialization
The model is initialized by two initial prices, p0 and p1, and initial weights n1,h, 1 ≤ h ≤ 4
(summing to 1; the initial share of robot traders n1 = 0). Given p0 and p1, the heuristics
forecasts can be computed and, using the initial weights of the heuristics, the price p2 can
be computed. In the next period, the forecasts of the heuristics are updated, the fraction of
“robot” traders is computed, while the same initial weights n1,h for individual rules are used
(past performance is not well deﬁned yet in period 3). The price p3 is computed and the
initialization stage is ﬁnished. Starting from period 4 the evolution according to Eq. 10 is
well deﬁned: ﬁrst the performance measure in Eq. 8 is updated, then, the new weights of the
heuristics are computed according to Eq. 9 and ﬁnally a new price is determined by Eq. 10.
4 Results and Discussion
Our evolutionary selection mechanism contains three parameters, β, η and δ, measuring re-
spectively (i) how sensitive individuals are with respect to diﬀerences in strategy performance,
(ii) how much relative weight they give to the most recent errors, and (iii) how strongly an
individual sticks to her previous strategy. We have performed numerous simulations and found
that the path-dependence feature of the model, in particular the capability to produce both
persistent oscillating and converging patterns, remains valid for a large range of parameters.1
Qualitatively, the simulation results are robust with respect to the parameters, but some quan-
1The simulation program for the model described in this paper together with brief documentation and
conﬁguration settings used for the reported simulations is freely available at http://www.cafed.eu/evexex.
12titative features, such as the speed of convergence, the amplitude and frequency of oscillations
and the stability of long run equilibrium, may change when parameters are varied.
To stress the path-dependence, for all reported simulations we have ﬁxed the parameter
values at β = 0.4, η = 0.7, δ = 0.9. The simulations thus only diﬀer in initial conditions, that
is, in the two initial prices {p0,p1} and in the initial distribution of agents over the population
of heuristics, i.e. initial weights {n1,1,n1,2,n1,3,n1,4}. For the three simulations in Fig. 1 the
initial conditions are as follows:
• for group 2 with monotonic convergence: initial prices: p0 = 49,p1 = 50.5; initial shares
n1,1 = n1,4 = 0.25, n1,2 = 0.35 and n1,3 = 0.15;
• for group 7 with dampened oscillations: initial prices: p0 = 44,p1 = 48; initial shares
n1,1 = 0, n1,2 = n1,4 = 0.17 and n1,3 = 0.66;
• for group 1 with persistent oscillations: initial prices: p0 = 51,p1 = 54; initial shares
n1,1 = n1,4 = 0.15, n1,2 = n1,3 = 0.35.
Fig. 1 shows realized prices (Left) for both the experiments and the heuristics switching
model, as well as the shares (Right) of the 4 heuristics. Fig. 2 shows the individual forecasts
in the experiments (Left) as well as the forecasts of the 4 heuristics (Right). Similar to the
experiments, in the simulation model coordination of forecasts arises.
Fig. 1 Left shows that the heuristics switching model closely matches all three diﬀerent
patterns, slow monotonic convergence to the fundamental price, dampened oscillatory price
movements and persistent price oscillations, in the laboratory experiments. The model exhibits
path dependence, since the simulations only diﬀer in initial states. In particular, the initial
distribution over the population of heuristics is important in determining which pattern is
more likely to emerge. Fig. 1 Right plots the corresponding transition paths of the fractions of
each of the four forecasting heuristics. In the case of monotonic convergence (Top), the four
fractions (and the individual forecasts) remain relatively close together during the simulation
causing slow (almost) monotonic convergence of the price to the fundamental equilibrium 60.
The increase in price causes a temporary domination of the dynamics by the strong trend
13heuristic between periods 13 and 23. However, this rule overestimates the price trend so that,
ultimately, the adaptive heuristic takes the lead, and price converges to fundamental. In the
second simulation (Middle), a large initial fraction of (strong) trend followers leads to a strong
rise of market prices in the ﬁrst 7 periods, followed by large price oscillations. After period 10
however, the fraction of strong trend followers decreases, while the fraction of the fourth rule,
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, rises to more than 80% after 30 periods. The ﬂexible
anchoring and adjustment heuristic forecasts better than the static strong trend following rule,
which overestimates the price trend. After 40 periods the fraction of the anchoring adjustment
heuristic starts slowly decreasing, and consequently the price oscillations slowly stabilize. In
the third simulation (Bottom) weak and strong trend followers each represent 35% of the initial
distribution of heuristics, causing a rise in prices which, due to the presence of weak trend
followers, is less sharp than in the previous case. However, already after 5 periods the fraction
of the anchoring adjustment heuristic starts to increase, because once again it predicts better
than the static strong and weak trend followers, who either overestimate or underestimate
the price trend. The fraction of the anchoring adjustment heuristic gradually increases and
dominates the market within 10 periods, rising to more than 70% after 40 periods, explaining
coordination of individual forecasts as well as persistent price oscillations around the long run
equilibrium level.
These simulations illustrate how the interaction and evolutionary selection of individual
forecasting heuristics may lead to coordination of individual behavior upon diﬀerent, path
dependent aggregate market outcomes. This explanation is consistent with recent work on
agent-based models of interaction explaining emergent phenomena in ﬁnancial markets, includ-
ing fat tails, clustered volatility, temporary bubbles and crashes and scaling laws (Lux and
Marchesi, 1999; Mantegna and Stanley, 1995; Farmer and Lo, 1999; Hommes, 2006; LeBaron,
2006). In real markets small price movements triggered by random news about market funda-
mentals may be reinforced by trend following strategies causing excessively volatile markets.
Evolution of market heuristics along the lines sketched here provides a simple, universal, be-
havioral explanation of these emergent phenomena.
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